Even though Raymond and Juanita Martinez already served four years in federal prison in part on allegations they were involved in a John “Boom” Mantanona alleged jury tampering crime, the federal government had a right to wait until their sentence was complete before charging them for that same crime. Their right to privacy also was not violated when federal agents failed to secure a separate warrant to listen to their phone conversations with Mr. Mantanona, who was the subject of a federal wire tap in a separate drug trafficking and police corruption investigation that began in 2018.
These are according to three rulings by a federal judge for the U.S. District Court of Guam that now paves the way for the jury tampering trial against the Martinezes to happen in August. The pretrial rulings on the three defense motions are significant for the Guam district. While they relied on precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court and other districts and appeals courts throughout the country, the rulings in the Martinez case now clarify issues on double jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness, and the ability for the federal government to listen in on citizens suspected of criminal activity in Guam.
A trial in this case may also mean another significant development: This will be the first case where Mr. Mantanona may appear as a witness for the government against the Martinezes. If that happens, it will confirm his cooperation with federal agents and the U.S. Attorney’s Office that to the present time has only been suspected. The former police officer and federal task force agent was indicted in early 2019 in federal court, but his case has been sealed tightly since then.
His anticipated testimony in the Martinez case also may reveal clues into other cases and into his suspected cooperation with the federal government.
Jury tampering allegations
The Martinezes faced two trials in 2018 for drug trafficking crimes that allegedly occurred in California in 2015 involving eight pounds of meth federal investigators say were headed to Guam. Both trials ended in hung juries, with more jurors voting to acquit the pair in the second trial.
In October 2018, while the second Martinez trial was ongoing, their private investigator – Boom Mantanona – became the target of a federal investigation that began in Hawaii. The investigation had nothing to do with the Martinezes, and involved allegations that Mr. Mantanona was part of an extensive drug trafficking organization that used the services of corrupt police officers to conceal activities from federal authorities.
A federal judge in Hawaii issued two consecutive wiretap warrants for Mr. Mantanona’s cell phone. During the monitoring of his phone calls, federal monitors intercepted two phone calls Mr. Mantanona made, one to each of the Martinezes.
In his November 1, 2018 phone conversation with Juanita Martinez, Mr. Mantanona discussed their second trial victory, informed her that he will have his family attend the trial, and raised the issue of his closeness with one of the jurors. He told her not to worry about the trial. To nearly all of Mr. Mantanona’s comments, Ms. Martinez replied, “Okay,” according to transcripts of the wiretaps, which were forwarded to the U.S. District Court of Guam.
On November 12, 2018, Mr. Mantanona spoke on the phone with Raymond Martinez and informed him that one of the jurors had contacted him. Mr. Martinez told him he did not wish to discuss such matters on the phone and ended the phone call.
Based on the evidence, Judge Frances Tydingco-Gatewood issued warrants for the arrest of the Martinezes, who were brought before the court in a sealed hearing. Federal prosecutors in Guam then arranged for federal prosecutors in California to charge the Martinezes in the central district of California for the 2015 drug trafficking allegations, and the pair was extradited in January to face trial there.
The Martinezes were detained, largely on the allegations of jury tampering. Between December 2018 and July of 2019, several hearings before a California federal judge involving what would have been the Martinezes’ third federal trial for the 2015 drug trafficking charges involved the jury tampering allegations, though the pair never were indicted for the crimes until 2022.
The pair ended up taking a plea deal with the federal government for the 2015 incident. The agreement was that they would plead to using a phone to further a drug trafficking conspiracy, and in return they would be sentenced to the maximum allowable sentence for that crime, which was calculated at four years in federal prison starting from their arrest and detention in Guam.
According to the federal transcripts and documents during that period through their sentencing, part of the calculation for their sentence included the jury tampering allegations, though there were no charges filed against the Martinezes for that crime at the time.
Prosecutorial vindictiveness (misconduct)
Federal prosecutors in Guam waited until the Martinezes were released from their respective federal penitentiaries in California, returned to Guam, and had returned to gainful employment before charging them in 2022 for the 2018 jury tampering incidents.
Following then-federal prosecutor Fred Black’s failure to achieve convictions in the second Martinez trial in 2018, Mr. Black said in open court that he would prosecute the Martinezes 30 or 100 times in order to achieve a conviction. The Guam court’s record, however (according to the current judge in the jury tampering case), does not contain this transcript. It is the defense’s attorneys who vouch that Mr. Black said this in open court.
“This court has no duty to scour the record looking for such a statement,” Judge Susan Oki Mollway said in her decision denying the Martinez motion to dismiss the case based on prosecutorial misconduct.
“Even if the Government’s counsel in the Guam criminal trial did say he would try the criminal charges 30 or 100 times if necessary and displayed frustration, and even if that attorney made disparaging remarks about Defendants, that would not give rise to any reasonable inference of vindictiveness here,” Ms. Mollway continued in her order.
Double jeopardy and collateral estoppel
The crux of the Martinez defense effort to dismiss the jury tampering case was the defendants’ belief in 2019 that the plea agreement they signed was punishing them, in part, for the jury tampering allegations.
“Defendants are unpersuasive in arguing that they reasonably believed that the agreements encompassed jury tampering and any asserted detrimental reliance on such a proposition has no basis in the record,” Ms. Mollway wrote in the portion of her order denying the Martinez motion to dismiss on double jeopardy and collateral estoppel grounds.
“The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three related protections: (1) it prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense,” Ms. Mollway wrote.
It is the third protection the Martinezes tried to invoke in their motion to dismiss the jury tampering charges filed in Guam in 2022.
And while Judge Mollway wrote there was “no basis in the record,” for the Martinezes to rely on a double jeopardy claim that they had already been punished for the jury tampering allegations, the federal court record in California contains several passages stating otherwise.
“Pursuant to the April 11, 2019, California Plea Agreement and the record related thereto, Mr. Martinez understood the Plea Agreement resolved all outstanding issues, including the jury tampering allegations,” the attorneys for Mr. Martinez wrote in his May 1 motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. According to the motion, the California Plea Agreement “specifically provided that additional promises, understandings, and agreements may be entered into ‘on the record in court.'”
Not only was the jury tampering allegation addressed in every California court proceeding leading up to the sentencing of the Martinezes, according to the motion, the full resolution was agreed upon by Guam’s federal prosecutors and then adopted by the California federal prosecutor.
Guam federal prosecutor Rosetta San Nicolas in her opposition to the motion to dismiss replied on May 6, arguing that federal law requires the court to view the California plea agreement as a contract, where courts apply contract principles, including the enforcement of a contract’s “plain language … if it is clear and unambiguous on its face.”
Ms. San Nicolas referred to the plea agreement itself, which states in part that “no additional promise, understanding or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.”
It is that last part of the sentence, “on the record in court,” that the Martinezes refer to in their arguments.
“The jury tampering allegations were made a part of the prior Guam and California proceedings and prior to agreeing to plead guilty in the California Plea Agreement, Mr. Martinez wanted to ensure that pleading guilty would dispose of the allegations against him with finality,” the defense argued in its double jeopardy dismissal motion.
Ms. San Nicolas, in her opposition, pointed to the series of questions asked by the court to the Martinezes at their change of plea hearing that resulted in their 48-month prison sentence, and included portions of the transcript where the judge asked in what’s known as the Rule 11 Colloquy whether prosecutors made any other promises. Ms. San Nicolas asserted that the Martinezes’ attorneys should have, at that point, specified the jury tampering issue.
However, Mr. Martinez’s attorney pointed out a part of the transcript Ms. San Nicolas did not include, where the judge in California said, “…the Court considers other factors that might result in either a higher or a lower sentence than the sentence suggested by the guideline range.” This was prior to all parties agreeing to the maximum applicable sentence of 48 months that, according to the Martinezes they believed satisfied all the allegations made against them to that point.
Kandit reviewed the California case, which showed multiple instances of the jury tampering allegations during the period of the extradition all the way to their July 29, 2019 sentencing. The jury tampering allegations were made part of the Guam proceedings, and at the Martinezes’ initial appearance in California where they already were detained, at a motion for bail review.
“Jury tampering was an issue in, referenced in and adjudicated in the California Case Criminal Minutes,” according to the Martinez motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. “The Government’s combined Sentencing Position for Defendants Raymond John Martinez and Juanita Martinez made an issue of, argued, and litigated jury tampering in support of its sentencing position and disposition of the Guam and California cases.”
That June 20, 2019 sentencing report by federal prosecutors in California appeared pivotal to the Martinez argument that the defendants already served prison time for the allegations.
In its memorandum of points and authorities that the Martinezes later stipulated to, federal prosecutors said the Martinezes were “two drug dealers who tried to smuggle methamphetamine into Guam, got caught, and then engaged in jury tampering to avoid responsibility for their actions … In their plea agreements, defendants agreed to recommend, and to refrain from seeking any sentence below, a Guideline-recommended statutory maximum sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment.”
In its statement of facts, the district attorney’s office wrote, “During the second trial, defendants ‘were aware of and/or participated in an attempt to obstruct justice . . . through efforts to improperly contact and influence a juror.”
Right before concluding the argument, the federal prosecutor made the jury tampering allegation’s weight on sentencing abundantly clear: “Defendants’ attempt to escape the consequences of their actions by influencing jurors further supports imposition of a 48-month sentence. During bail review proceedings, this Court reviewed evidence provided by the government and concluded that defendants ‘were aware of and/or participated in an attempt to obstruct justice . . . through efforts to improperly contact and influence a juror. (Dkt. 61 at 4.) Defendants’ efforts to impede the administration of justice only compounded the seriousness of their criminal conduct. Under the circumstances, the statutory maximum sentence recommended by the Guidelines and the parties is amply justified.”
The Martinez dismissal motion reminded the court that Mr. Martinez argued with prosecutors about the jury tampering language because he knew the allegations would weigh on his sentencing. In a response to the government’s sentencing brief in 2019, he wrote “Juror issue – the government forgets that in the second trial, four other jurors voted not guilty, in recognition of the failures of the government’s case.”
According to the Martinez motion, “When the Court sentenced Mr. Martinez after considering the entire court record, the punishment imposed encompassed the jury tampering allegations.”
At sentencing on July 25, 2019, U.S. District Court Judge Fernando Olguin said at the outset, “I have read and considered the following documents: The presentence report filed on June 17, 2019, the Government’s sentencing papers filed on June 20, 2019, and defendant’s sentencing papers filed on July 3, 2019.”
The focus of the judge’s questioning of attorneys on both sides focused on whether both sides fully comprehended the sentencing papers, which included the recommendation of the 48 month prison sentence that included the jury tampering allegation.
Judge Olguin accepted the sentencing reports and sentenced the Martinezes to 48 months in prison “Based on the plea agreement and the record before the Court,” he said at sentencing.
Ms. Mollway, the judge for the current jury tampering case, relied on Ms. San Nicolas’ contract language argument instead of the California court record, writing in her denial order “If Defendants wanted their plea agreements to encompass the jury tampering charges, they were free to negotiate such an agreement.”
“[T]he California district court’s consideration of jury tampering when determining the appropriate sentences trigger any violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause,” Ms. Mollway wrote, pointing to a 1995 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Witte v. United States.
“In Witte,” the judge wrote, “the defendant had pled guilty to having conspired to possess and having attempted to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it. In determining his sentence, the court held him responsible for not only marijuana, but also over 1000 kilograms of cocaine that the court determined was ‘relevant conduct.'”
Mr. Witte was sentenced to 12 years in prison, in part on the allegations of the cocaine possession. Some time after his sentencing, he was charged for the cocaine possession as a separate crime. Mr. Witte raised a double jeopardy challenge.
“Even though the uncharged conduct with respect to cocaine in the first trial was used to enhance Witte’s guideline range, the Supreme Court determined that that consideration did not bar the later charge,” Ms. Mollway wrote, comparing the case to the Martinez case and recognizing that part of their original sentence for the meth case included punishment for the allegations of jury tampering. “Witte’s sentence in the earlier case was within the legislatively authorized punishment. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”
Fruit of the poisonous tree
The final motion the judge dispensed with involved the defense’s push to suppress evidence the Martinezes claimed was illegally obtained by the government, making it “fruit of the poisonous tree,” as illegally obtained evidence often is called in criminal cases.
In their motion to suppress, the Martinezes maintained that the two wiretapped phone calls that led to the charges against them were for a completely different case that did not involved them at all. In a hearing this month on the motions, one of their defense attorneys said the government could easily have obtained a warrant against the Martinezes when the intercepted phone calls came to the attention of the FBI. However, federal agents failed to secure such warrants. Therefore, they alleged, their constitutional rights were violated and the evidence obtained against them was secured illegally.
The defense also alleged that the government did not exhaust all other forms of investigation prior to leaning on the wiretaps to charge the Martinezes.
In order to exclude the evidence through an evidentiary hearing on the matter, Ms. Mollway, quoting a 2004 9th Circuit Court of Appeals case (United States v. Staves), wrote “the defendant must make a substantial showing that the government intentionally or recklessly omitted or falsified information and that such information was material to a finding of probable cause or necessity.”
She found that there was no allegation of false statement or omission by the FBI agent in his applications for the Mantanona wiretap warrants that led to the interception of the two phone calls with the Martinezes.
“While Defendants characterize the interception of calls between Mantanona and them concerning jury tampering as ‘piggybacking’ on the probable cause with respect to drug crimes,” Ms. Mollway wrote, “18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) specifically allows law enforcement to capture evidence of other crimes while conducting a wiretap … Thus, the Government may use intercepted communications concerning jury tampering even though the original wiretap of the phone Mantanona was using concerned methamphetamine violations.”
